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Affect and Critique: A Politics of Boredom 
 
What are the politics of boredom? And how should we relate to boredom? In this 
paper I explore these questions through cases where the disaffection and restlessness 
of boredom have become a matter of concern in the UK and USA at the junctures 
between fordism and neoliberalism, and amid today’s resurgence of right-wing 
populism. I argue that what repeats across the critique of the ‘ordinary ordinariness’ 
of fordism, the neoliberal counterrevolution, and today’s right-wing populism is a 
‘promise of intensity’ – the promise that life will feel eventful and boredom will be 
absent. As I make this argument, I reflect on the role of critique in the context of the 
multiplication of modes of inquiry that has accompanied the interest in affect across 
the humanities and social sciences. Rejecting the dismissal of critique in some affect 
related work, I advocate for and exemplify a type of ‘diagnostic critique’ based on 
the practice of conjunctural analysis as pioneered by Stuart Hall and colleagues.    

















Affect and Critique: A Politics of Boredom 
 
“All objects are scenes with many entry points. We are always intuiting and 
inventing associations, thus changing their shapes.”  




Boredom is strange, or perhaps our relations to it are. It is frequently invoked 
by states, the media, social movements, and individuals as a cause for a 
heterogeneous list of actions coded as excessive and anti-social; knife crime and 
vandalism (Kinsella 2011; Scottish Government 2014), breaking lockdown 
regulations during COVID-19 (e.g. BBC News 28th April, Sky News 21st April), 
violence and self-harm in prisons (Independent Monitoring Board 2018), worker 
suicide (Fair Labor Association 20181), world revolution (Katsiaficas 1987), 
indifference to the atrocity of Grenfell Tower (Younge 2019), and much more. Yet, at 
the same time, boredom is regularly dismissed as trivial, naturalised as a common 
and inevitable dimension of being human, and rarely subject to the public concern 
and action that surrounds other affects. Indeed, the stasis and stall of boredom 
appears to lack the intensity, the obvious harm and damage, of other affects that are 
now central to critiques of neoliberal life in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. 
Compare with how stress and burnout, for example, have become public matters of 
concern in the midst of critiques of the frenzies of neoliberal life (Chabot 2019). Or 
think about how various public moods are invoked as causes of Brexit, the election 
of Donald J Trump, and other contemporary events and political changes in the 
midst of a ‘crisis’ of neoliberalism: racialized resentment, a feeling of being left 
behind, online outrage, anger at elites, and so on. Boredom does not seem to quite fit 
with these strong stories about the role of heightened passions in a turbulent 




present. However, if we slow down and pay attention we find that claims about 
boredom as collective condition or bored subjects surface in the background to many 
recent attempts to diagnose the affective character of the present: cycles of online 
outrage interrupt the almost but not quite boredom of the scroll; boredom settles in 
peripheral places supposedly left behind by a rapacious global capital; it exists as a 
felt consequence of austerity in places where youth services have contracted; it can 
be a symptom of burnout, etc.  
Consequential and trivial, overshadowed by other affects and yet in the 
background, too absent and too present, boredom today is entangled in a set of 
contradictions. Contradictions which, although not the focus of this paper, we see at 
play in relation to COVID-19 as claims about boredom become a key way to narrate 
the collective affective experiences of the suspension and deferral of ‘normality’. 
What might staying with boredom and the cluster of affects that gather around it 
teach us about what was missing in a contemporary condition which, pre COVID-19, 
was more often narrated through stories of intensity and strong feeling? And how 
should we relate not only to boredom but also to the absences that boredom 
indicates in the context of the multiplication of modes of inquiry that have 
accompanied and animated affect-related work in the social sciences? (e.g. forms of 
descriptive (e.g. Stewart 2007) or speculative empiricism (e.g. Massumi 2015)). My 
starting point for thinking about what might be lost when boredom is present and 
how we might relate to boredoms as they happen and become matters of concern is 
found in some reflections on children’s boredom by the psychoanalyst Adam 
Phillips (1993). Echoing Tolstoy’s formulation of boredom as ‘desire for desires’, 
Phillips describes boredom as a “wish for a desire” (71). His is an account of a 
particular form of boredom and its celebratory in tone, it isn’t the boredom of 
oppression or subjugation so we have to be cautious, but he describes boredom in a 
way that has always resonated as it centres a particular kind of relation between the 
present and events: boredom is a “state of suspended anticipation” (71). What is 
missing when boredom is present is what he goes on to call the “experience of 
anticipation” (72), or what I would term the presence of a possible future event that 
may be felt through a range of anticipatory affects from dread to hope, from fear to 
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excitement. Boredom settles when events are absent. But this emphasis on flatness, 
on the unequal distribution of eventfulness and possibility, only goes part of the way 
to understanding why boredom matters. We also have to consider what boredom 
does – what kind of relation boredom is and enacts. As time stills and space slows, 
boredom happens as a practice of detachment from an event, object, scene, 
landscape, person, ideology, and so on. And it’s the turning away which happens as 
boredom settles that has been at the heart of debates about the ethics of being bored 
(e.g. Raposa 1999 on acedia). But it is also this turning away which has been central 
to the valorisation of a creative boredom that initiates new possibilities (e.g. 
Benjamin 1999). Staying with boredom teaches us about how detachments happen, 
as well as how (un)eventfulness is distributed.   
 Boredom signals, then, that something has led to a suspension of 
anticipation and that some form of detachment and exit is happening. From this 
starting suggestion, one that hesitates before claiming that boredom is incapacity 
or opportunity, in this paper I focus on occasions over the past forty years in the 
UK and the USA in which boredom became a political concern at the junctures 
between fordism and neoliberalism and neoliberalism and right-wing populism. 
The examples are from a wider project that attempts to ask what boredom is 
today as a way to understand the affective character of neoliberal lives. It starts 
from the presumption that there exist a plurality of boredoms which are 
differentially articulated with the apparatuses and practices through which 
neoliberalism is morphing in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. In this paper I 
speculate about the affective continuities and differences across different 
apparatuses and formations, arguing that what repeats across the critique of 
Fordism, the neoliberal counterrevolution from the late 1970s, and contemporary 
right-wing populism after the 2008 financial crisis is a ‘promise of intensity’: the 
promise that life will feel eventful and boredom will be absent. As I make this 
argument, I offer one response to the question posed above of how we should 
relate to boredom, or indeed any other affect. Stepping outside of either a 
condemnatory or reparative relation with affective life, I exemplify a form of 
diagnostic critique orientated to conjunctures.   
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My argument unfold over three sections. In the first – Against Boredom – I 
explore how the boredom of an exception – mid-century fordism – was central to 
what Boltanski & Chiapelle (2005) call the artistic critique of capitalism. The 
following section – Diagnostic Critique and Affective Life - pauses and argue for a 
shift in the form of critique in work on affect – from a hermeneutics of suspicion 
to a practice of conjunctural analysis as pioneered by Stuart Hall and colleagues. 
The final section – Right-Wing Populism and the Promise of Intensity - speculates that 
right-wing populism in the UK and USA involves a politics of boredom which 
repeats the promise of intensity which was central to the artistic critique of 
fordism and thereafter the ‘promissory legitimacy’ (Beckert 2020) of 
neoliberalism. In conclusion, I open up a wider project on the relations between 
boredom and contemporary conditions in the midst of transformations in 
neoliberalisms. 
 
Section One: Against Boredom  
 
“We do not want to exchange a world in which the guarantee of no longer dying 
of hunger is exchanged for the risk of dying of boredom” 
(Situationalist Slogan cited in Katsiaficas (1987: 99)) 
 
 In 1977, the British punk band the Clash released ‘London’s Burning’. The 
lyrics are incongruous, juxtaposing burning and boredom in an affective image of 
an emergency present overfull with deadening activities:  
 
“All across the town, all across the night 
Everybody’s driving with full headlights 
Black or white, you turn it on, you face the new religion 
Everybody’s sitting 'round watching television 
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London’s burning with boredom now 
London’s burning dial nine-nine-nine-nine-nine 
London’s burning with boredom now 
London’s burning dial nine-nine-nine-nine-nine” 
  
The juxtaposition of intensity and disaffection – here the violence of ‘burning’ 
with the flatness of ‘sitting round watching television’ - was central to the 
disruptive ethos, energy and style of UK punk culture (see Marcus 1989). 
Boredom was regularly invoked in UK punk as part of a critique of the monotony 
and vapidity of Fordism and working class life, or rather the empty time of a life 
divided into stable work and compensatory leisure at the cusp of the neoliberal 
counterrevolution. The Buzzcocks’ 1976 song Boredom echoing the sense in 
London’s Burning of a stalled, stuck, present. In the suspended time of boredom, in 
which disaffection dominates, the future is lost:  
 
“And now, I'm a-living in this a-movie 
But it doesn't move me 
I'm the man that's waiting for the phone to ring 
Hear it ring-a-ring-a-ring-a-fucking-ding 
 
You know me, I'm acting dumb, uh 




You see, there's a-nothing that's a-behind me 
I'm already a has-been, uh 
Because my future ain't a-what it was 




Only two destinations were available in stuck time – Boredom or Nowhere, as the 
now iconic art work designed by Jamie Reed for the Sex Pistols’ Pretty Vacant 
bluntly stated. The shouted refrain of the feminist Punk group The Slits song ‘A 
Boring Life’ – “how could anyone survive this boring life” – exemplifies what 
founding member Viv Albertine described in interview with Jon Savage as the 
“terrible fear of boredom” or an “absolute horror of it” which underpinned the 
energy of Punk (Savage 2010: 293)  
Amid the roiling economic and political crises of mid-late 1970s Britain and 
changing expectations and aspirations as the fordist settlement weakened, Punk 
provided one answer to the question posed by Malcolm McLaren, before he became 
manager of the Sex Pistols, in a banner hung on stage for the New York Dolls’ early 
1970s shows: “What are the politics of Boredom?” (Marcus, 1989: 49). The answer 
was a strong one, in many ways uncharacteristic of the flat, sometimes mocking, talk 
that occasionally makes the presence or absence of boredom into a matter of public 
concern. Boredom named a kind of ‘living death’ felt equally and tragically across 
work and leisure. The counter-cultural protest against boredom tied UK punk 
culture in particular to the events and slogans of the situationalists and their actions 
against boredom (Marcus 1989). As Savage (1988: 52) put it, writing about the Sex 
Pistols but with comments that extend to punk culture in general, “’Boredom’ 
described the expansive, occluded, utopian politics that built up at the Sex Pistols 
core”. Punk became a “theatrical expression of boredom’s prison” (ibid. 55), albeit 
one which was articulated differently across US and UK punk cultures given their 
emergence from different mid-1970s working class and middle class formations and 
periods of economic change (see Ambrosch (2015), for example, on the relation of the 
Ramones to the promise and actuality of suburbia in America).   
Whilst specific connections can be traced between punk cultures and the 
situationalists and the event of 1968 (Marcus 1989), the critique of boredom echoed a 
wider new left critique of a consumer culture organised around attachment to the 
promise of the new and leisure as a scene of compensation for work. For one 
particularly caustic example, consider Adorno’s (1991) account of boredom in his 
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1977 essay on Free Time. Arguing against free time as an “oasis of unmediated life”, 
he ties boredom to a complex mixture of powerlessness and the “defamation and 
atrophy of the imagination” (ibid. 192). He emphasises the historicity and thus 
contingency of boredom:  
 
“Boredom is a function of life which is lived under the compulsion to work, 
and under the strict division of labour. It need not be so. Whenever behaviour 
in spare time is truly autonomous, determined by free people for themselves, 
boredom rarely figures; it need not figure in activities which cater merely for 
the desire for pleasure, any more than it does in those free time activities which 
are reasonable and meaningful in themselves ... Boredom is the reflection of 
objective dullness.” 
(Adorno 1991: 192) 
 
As with the protest against boredom by the punks and situationalists, Adorno 
critiques boredom as a symptom of the division of labour under fordism and, in 
particular, the compensatory role of leisure in the context of the compulsion to work. 
Preceding and in many ways anticipating more recent critiques of the foreclosure of 
alternatives and the loss of the capacity to imagine (e.g. Fisher 2011), his declaration - 
“It need not be so” (ibid. 192) – expresses the same utopian desire that courses 
through the ethos of punk: that life can be lived without boredom (a protest against 
the boredom of the ‘normal’ that was also central to rock (Grossberg 1992: 180)).   
 Punk is but one example of how boredom surfaced as a matter of concern in 
art, activism and politics from the early early/mid 1960s in Western Europe and 
North America. It can be understood as one expression of the “revolution against 
boredom” which Katsiaficas (1987: 12) in his history of the new left argues was 
expressed in May-June 1968 in Paris and reverberated globally. Beyond this event, 
boredom was named and protested as part of an emerging dissatisfaction with the 
Fordist settlement (and so coexisted with other affects of crisis, as named in phrases 
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such as ‘winter of discontent’ and connected more to insecurity and turbulence2). For 
example, in the early 1970s boredom amongst assembly line workers in the USA – 
the ‘blue collar blues’3 - was increasingly named as a problem for retention and 
productivity, in ways a little different from the threat of the idle or lazy worker 
(although the problem of boredom in relation to automation had been present since 
the inauguration of assembly line work e.g. Wyatt (1929), Robinson (1923)). Boredom 
was connected to absenteeism, risk of accidents, poor work, strikes, and sabotage. 
Ways of measuring ‘boredom proneness’ emerged, as well as attempts to motivate, 
make work more fulfilling, increase compensations, and so on (see New York Times 
1972; Hill 19754). If claims were made that workers no longer accepted the boredom 
of assembly line work as a trade off for affluence (on which see Goldthorpe et al 
1968), critiques of boredom also related to the fordist gendered division of labour. 
For example, boredom played a key role in second wave feminism. As Betty Friedan 
(1963) named the ‘problem that has no name’ she offered a critique of the unequal 
gendered division of boredom and the subsumption of women to the family under 
Fordism. Various described as “discontent’ or “dissatisfaction” (ibid. 24, 25), 
symptoms of the “strange newness” (26) of the ‘problem with no name’ included a 
“feeling of desperation” and a “terrible tiredness” (30) which may be “due to 
boredom” (31). Boredom was also central to moral panics in the 1970s around new 
figures and practices at the intersection of youth culture and consumer culture on 
the edge of society – the ‘college dropout’ who exits university through lack of 
interest (Bernstein 1975) or the working class ‘juvenile delinquent’ (Corrigan 1979).  
The vision is one of disaffected subjects detaching from work or leisure or 
family and desiring ‘more’ to life than mid century fordism can offer. This led to 
                                                          
2 The phrase ‘winter of discontent’ is credited by being first used in an editorial by The Sun 
newspaper in 1979, and refers to a 1978-79 period of intensified industrial action and disruption 
under the then Labour Callaghan government. An attempt to name the public mood and resonating 
with the anti-state and anti-trade union moods that are part of the affective structure of neoliberalism, 
it was recently invoked and reactivated by conservative politicians in relation to Jeremy Corbyn’s 
leadership of the labour party.  
3 As named in a speech by James Rosow, then assistant secretary for policy, evaluation and research at 
the US Department of Labor, on October 29th 1970 at the conference of the American Compensation 
Association.   
4 ‘Workers increasingly rebel against boredom on assembly line’ New York Times, April 2, 1972.  
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wider claims of the importance of boredom by cultural critics trying to understand a 
period of intense change. Writing in the mid 1970s, and with more than a hint of 
moral condemnation, Bernstein (1975: 518), for example, identifies a “search for 
sensations of ever mounting intensity and impact” in as varied cultural phenomena 
as portrayals of sex and violence in cinema, use of colour in the visual arts, increased 
number of extra-marital affairs, rock music, and the encounter group movement. 
What is specific about the critiques of life within fordism is that they all centre the 
affective bargain of fordism: economic security for a tolerated boredom. Beyond the 
punks, there is a whole artistic genre dedicated to dramatizing and reworking this 
critique of monotony, especially focused on the intimacy between fantasy and 
disaffection in the new space-times of consumer culture, including the suburbs and 
malls. Think, for example, of how the architectures and atmospheres of post-war 
fordist Britain are staged in the British artist Martin Parr’s series ‘Bored Postcards’ – 
where the boredom of ordinary life is mocked and wondered at simultaneously.  
However, these critiques of fordist forms of living focused on the subjects 
who remain in proximity to its cluster of promises and good life fantasies. They do 
not necessarily fit with differently positioned subjects and groups for whom the 
security of fordism and affluence of post war consumer culture remained an 
exception rather than norm (with the security of fordism itself being an exception in 
capitalist history (Neilson & Rossiter 2008)). Consider, for example, bell hooks (1981) 
opening in Feminist Theory From Margin to Center where she particularises the bored 
leisured subject of ‘the problem that has no name’:  
 
“Friedan’s famous phrase, ‘the problem that has no name’, often quoted to 
describe the condition of women in this society, actually referred to the plight 
of a select group of college-educated, middle- and upper-class, married white 
women—housewives bored with leisure, with the home, with children, with 
buying products, who wanted more out of life”. 




`By centring and universalising white middle- and upper-class women’s almost 
existential boredom and their desire for ‘more’, hooks argued that Friedan ignored 
other women’s pressing political concerns - issues of economic survival and racial 
discrimination, amongst others. hooks’ critique reminds us that boredom at the ever-
same and the desire for ‘more’ is the boredom of those at the ‘centre’ of a racialized 
formation of post-war capitalism (likewise see Majumdar (2013) on the colonial 
yearning for excitement and boredom as a symptom of colonial domination).  
Particularising the bored subject that surfaced in critiques of fordism opens 
up a project beyond the scope of this essay – understanding how forms of boredom 
within fordism related to different lived experiences of economic and other 
(in)securities and changing patterns of expectation and aspiration. For now, we can 
say that what crosses between these different ways in which boredom became a 
concern and problem is the experience of empty, stuck, time. In different ways, 
boredom became a sign of the failure of fordist work, leisure and their relation to 
enable activities to feel meaningful and authentic and purposeful. Critique is focused 
on the repetitive time and experience of work/leisure but also, perhaps more 
interestingly, on boredom as symptom of an emerging crisis in the ‘promissory 
legitimacy’ (Beckert 2020) of fordism organised around the family wage and 
compensatory leisure. Even if they shared little else, punks in the UK, American 
factory workers, and white middle and upper class housewives in the USA perhaps 
shared a desire for ‘more’. Where the ‘more’ was differently articulated, in relation to 
‘careers’ for Friedan’s women for example, but reflected a desire for the present to 
somehow feel more intense. Long before Berlant’s (2011) identification of how 
conventional good life fantasies sustain and harm as people stay in proximity to 
them even as they fray and become unattainable, the claim that life was boring 
morphed into a critique of the fantasies and promises that accompanied fordism. 
Instead of the ‘crisis ordinariness’ (Berlant 2011) of the post-Fordist present, what 
was critiqued was ‘ordinary ordinariness’: repetitive, inert, empty time where 




Section Two: Diagnostic Critique and the ‘Affective Present’ 
 
Did this form of fordist boredom – the boredom of those who remained in 
proximity to its fantasies – become residual in the midst of the expansion and 
intensification of neoliberalising apparatuses from the early 1980s organised around 
the promise of participation in the market? The ‘promissory legitimacy’ (Beckert 
2020) of neoliberalism was in part founded on incorporating the critique of how 
fordism felt and offering an alternative experience of enlivening risk and positive 
uncertainty (as well as the persistent articulation of neoliberal policies and 
programmes with fordist good life fantasies, most prominently nation or family or 
security (see Hall (1988) on these articulations)). What participation in the market 
promised was a form of ‘good life’ based on autonomy, individuality and choice 
(Boltanski and Chiapello 2005) in which the boredom of ‘ordinary ordinariness’ 
would be transcended. Summarising a range of work, we could say that the what we 
can call the ‘promise of intensity’ – that life would feel eventful and boredom would 
be absent - was assembled in two principle ways. First, the anti-state mood, the 
‘state-phobia’ that coexists in neoliberalism with the strategic use of the state to 
create markets (Foucault 2008), was refracted through a popular critique of the social 
democratic ‘Big State’ as bureaucratic and paternal (‘red tape’), as that which bores 
as it stifles and stills life (itself repeating the longstanding critique of the 
“predictability” of ‘impersonal’ modern bureaucracy (Weber 2015 cited in Holm 
2020), as well as resonating with popular representations in the West of the 
boringness of life in Eastern Europe). Alongside the negative affects which were 
attached to the ‘Big State’, secondly, changing modes of subjectification centred the 
enlivening experiences which followed from risk and orientations to an open future, 
as typically expressed in the heroic figure of the entrepreneur or the consumer as a 
figure of enjoyment. This shift included attempts to make all work into an occasion 
for self-fulfilment and enrichment, for example through the injection of creativity 
and flexibility into mundane tasks (Boltanski & Chiapello 2005; Dardot & Laval 
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2013). Put differently, we could say that neoliberalising apparatuses domesticated 
the critique of the boredom of fordism, by promising release from disaffection and 
flatness through participation in the market.   
 So far I have offered a proposition: that boredom became a matter of concern 
in relation to fordism and neoliberalising apparatuses reacted by offering a ‘promise 
of intensity’, whereby participation in the market became a means to self-realisation 
and fulfilment in which life would feel eventful and boredom would be absent. As 
with my observations on fordism, this proposition opens up a wider project on the 
specific relations between boredoms and neoliberalising apparatuses, not least the 
forms of boredom that accompany the expansion of bureaucratic forms and practices 
(audits, etc) that is the oft-noted effect of the extension of relations of competition in 
actually existing neoliberalisms (see Davis 2020). Before developing this proposition 
by way of a discussion of boredom in the midst of today’s ‘crisis ordinariness’ 
(Berlant 2011), let’s pause and reflect on what kind of thing boredom is in my 
account so far. My emphasis has been less on boredom as felt, and more on how 
boredom surfaced as a matter of concern, becoming a sign of dissatisfaction, and 
gathering a series of surprisingly strong affects around it as the fordist settlement 
weakened. Whilst the exact critique is rarely articulated, across the punks, second 
wave feminism and so on a claim was made that boredom is symptomatic of 
something lost in relation to unspecified virtues that go by names like dignity, 
spontaneity, fulfilment, or freedom. Boredom was, to put it in Boltanski and 
Chiapello’s (2005) terms, enrolled as part of the ‘artistic’ critique of fordism from the 
1960s: invoked as symptomatic of a crisis of not only meaning and purpose but also 
of intensity. In this critique of fordism, we find an update of how boredom has long 
figured in criticisms of capitalist modernity more broadly – where the disaffection of 
boredom is part of a story of modern alienation, and becomes a secondary effect of a 
series of now familiar, nameable, causes: rationalisation, secularisation, 
individualisation (see Goodstein 2005). 
Is this how we should relate to boredom - name and protest it as part of a 
critique of the affective degradations of contemporary capitalisms? Identify it as an 
ill and proclaim that life can be lived without boredom in a way that valorises fun, 
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spontaneity, passion, intensity, or some other virtue? Critique is only one mode of 
inquiry. There are others. What else might we notice if we learn to relate differently 
to boredom and the affects that gather around it? Across the social sciences and 
humanities, interdisciplinary work on affect has experimented with other modes, 
whilst continuing to align with the political or ethical goals of critique. What is 
questioned is critique as sole, habitual and therefore default mode of inquiry, and 
how the hegemonic position of critique crowds out other ways of encountering 
worlds and achieving ethical and political ends. The concern with critique is 
twofold. First, work has argued that critique is tied to and reproduces a logic of 
modernity and Enlightenment thought, involving what Sedgwick (2013: 144). 
describes as a “certain disarticulation, disavowal, and misrecognition of other ways 
of knowing”. Second, critique encounters the world through a limited range of 
moods – principally suspicion (Felski 2015) and paranoia (Sedgwick 2013) – and 
modes of argumentation – primarily exposure (including demystification) and 
condemnation (or more loosely ‘problematizing’ or ‘questioning’ in Foucaultian 
influenced critique). Whilst these moods and modes of argumentation and the 
reasons for caution about them differ, they reproduce a division between the shown 
and hidden – with the task of the critic being to reveal the hidden to a supposedly 
unknowing audience who will be moved by revelation.  
For now, I have left what is meant by ‘critique’ vague. The aim of Sedgwick 
and Felski is to particularise the orientation, mood and mode of argument of 
critique, disturb the faith in the effectual force of exposure (and associated 
triumphalism), and to allow multiple modes of inquiry to proliferate and flourish. 
Their aim is not to end or escape critique, indeed perhaps such a move is impossible, 
but to unsettle its hegemonic status, and the presumption that being critical equates 
with being political or ethical. In response, one move might be to change the shape 
of the object – here boredom - by experimenting with speculative modes of inquiry 
orientated to potentiality and animated by a mood and disposition of hope. Where 
hope serves as a way of orientating to the not-yet: futures and therefore also pasts 
which might be different from the here and now (or, as Back (2021: 18) wonderfully 
puts it “glimmers of worldly hope”). Instead of a symptom, boredom might be related 
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to as a herald: the inarticulate expression of a desire for more to life. We would 
encounter boredom for its potentiality, for its restlessness, for how it moves subjects 
into new relations and attachments. We would suspend judgment, and follow what 
opens up in the wake of the detachment that is boredom, staying close to and 
valorising escape attempts, from daydreaming to world historical revolutions. 
Boredom would become another seemingly negative affect which is valued and 
becomes otherwise through inquiry (e.g. Probyn (2005) on shame or Chevkotich 
(2002) on depression) (a reversal of the typical critical move of demystification in 
relation to positively coded affects e.g. Ahmed (2011) on happiness or Pedwell (2014) 
on empathy).  
Whilst useful as a reminder that our modes of inquiry assemble our objects, 
we should be cautious. There is nothing distinctive about a reparative orientation or 
hopeful mood as ways of encountering boredom. In the context of versions of the 
artistic critique of existence in relation to capitalist modernity, potential has long 
been found in certain kinds of (normally gendered) boredom. There are many 
examples. For both Benjamin (1999) and Kracauer (1995), for example, certain kinds 
of gendered boredom are treated as a form of waiting which functions as a portal to 
something different by interrupting captivation by the ever-same in the guise of the 
new. Kracauer (1995: 334) writes of boredom as “the only proper occupation” and 
how, with patience, by staying with one’s boredom one “experiences a kind of bliss 
that is almost unearthly”. Likewise, Benjamin (1999: D2a, 1) valorises boredom as 
“the warm grey fabric lined on the inside with the most lustrous and colourful of 
silks”. The American post-war avant-garde, to give another example, experimented 
with deliberately producing boredom – through an “aesthetic of indifference” 
(Roth’s (1998 [1977]) or “aesthetic of the indecidable” (Katz (1998)) that performed 
silence and repetition – in complex relation to the illusory plenitude of mass 
consumer culture and the violent atmosphere of 1950s cold war.  
We reach an impasse. How to encounter boredom in a manner which does 
not reproduce the polarisation in how boredom, as per other affects, has been 
figured as either symptom or herald in reflections on discontent? My starting point 
16 
 
is to suspend an affirmative disposition, and return to the discussion of critique. I 
left what is meant by ‘critique’ vague above. Implicitly, critique is treated as a 
reading practice – a hermeneutics of suspicion based on a distinction between the 
hidden and shown whose effect is demystification. In making this equation, the 
discussion risks missing a slightly different tradition of ‘diagnostic critique’. Sharing 
an emphasis on denaturalisation, diagnostic critique departs from critique-as-
hermeneutics of suspicion by a) orientating to how the geo-historically specific 
present feels and b) describing and assessing the different forces which gather and 
are assembled to constitute that present. Two examples illustrate this mode of 
inquiry. Both are concerned with the US and the sustaining and harmful role of the 
promise of progress in crisis times and in the midst of racialised and other injustices. 
Moving between USA aesthetics, everyday life and politics in a crisis of 
neoliberalism, Berlant’s (2011) account of ‘cruel optimism’ tracks the “historical 
sensorium” which has emerged “since the fantasmatic part of the optimism about 
structural transformation realized less and less traction in the world” (3). As 
optimistic objects/scenarios which held space for the good life dissolve, optimism 
becomes “cruel”, in the sense of “when something you desire is actually an obstacle 
to your flourishing” (1). Berlant’s account of the dissolution and loss of fantasies, can 
be read alongside Winters’ (2016) engagement with the persistent belief that America 
follows a trajectory of racial progress. Winters argues that the fantasy and promise of 
racial progress coexists with and is undercut by a Black cultural, political and 
intellectual tradition in which hope is “drapped in black” – articulated with loss, 
tragedy and melancholy. As well as identifying the presence of this form of hope in 
American life, he also advocates for it as a way of avoiding silencing the history of 
racial violence or avoiding dissonant memories or attachments. By supplementing 
Berlant on the coexistence of different kinds of optimism by showing the fraught 
relation Black lives have to one fantasy that structures American exceptionalism, 
Winters demonstrates the work ‘post-racial’ forms of optimism continue to do in 
foreclosing the capacity to face racial violence.   
Juxtaposing Berlant and Winters’ accounts of the structuring role of optimism 
in post-war American life allows us to distinguish diagnostic critique from other 
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modes of inquiry orientated towards affective life: it discloses the composition of the 
always multiple ‘affective present’ (Berlant 2011), the boundaries of which are never 
given, but subject to revision as people adjust to events, as lives are restructured, and 
as different forces become palpable. A little different to affect related work that stays 
with bodies coming together in the unruliness of encounters or scenes, diagnostic 
critique aims to disclose how the affective character of presents are (de/re)composed 
through multiple forces working at different levels of abstraction. One ‘affective 
present’ might be the mid 1970s moment in the UK from which punk culture 
emerged, for example. In this orientation to the present as “mediated affect” (Berlant 
2011: 4), diagnostic critique follows Williams’ (1977) orientation to how the present is 
encountered affectively through registers of feeling, named deliberately and 
necessarily vaguely by him as “characteristic elements of impulse, restraint, and 
tones” (132). There are, though, different types of diagnostic critique (compare, for 
example, how Ahmed (2011) reads the politics of affect through figures and Berlant 
(2011) through scenes). Here I advocate for one type that has received less attention 
in relation to recent work on affect - ‘conjunctural analysis’, as practiced by Hall et al 
(2013 [1978]) in their analysis of mugging, and Hall (1988) in his analysis of 
Thatcherism. What conjunctural analysis offers is a practice which begins from a 
named affect/emotion and then moves between different levels of abstraction and 
across different phenomena to offer propositions about the character of the affective 
present. As an example, consider the analysis by Hall et al (2017) of the wave of fear 
and anxiety, the ‘moral panic’, over the threat of mugging in late 1970s Britain. 
Starting from the fears and anxieties which were catalysed and intensified by the 
racialised event of mugging and amplified into a general sense of the presence and 
threat of disorder (1970s student protests etc), Hall et al trace the emergent formation 
of a “law and order” society in the midst of multiple, intersecting crises as the post-
war corporatist settlement began to collapse – high inflation, industrial unrest, the 
fallout from the end of empire. By working across these levels, Policing the Crisis 
details how an intensification of the repressive side the state apparatus was 
conditioned between 1970-74 by what was variously described by Hall et al (2017) as 
a “sharpening climate” (269), an “atmosphere ... of mounting, often carefully 
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organised, public hysteria” (270) and “a ‘scare’ pre-election mood”(272). Over the 
1970s the “routinisation of control” and associated “exceptional state” (268) became 
normal as Britain “edged, bit by bit, towards a law and order mood, now advancing, 
now retreating, moving into a crab-like way, sideways into Armageddon” (272).  
Policing the Crisis was prescient. It anticipated the project of ‘authoritarian 
populism’ which Hall (1988) went on to argue defined Thatcherism as neoliberal 
‘counterrevolution’ which yoked security and family to the promise of the market. It 
serves an exemplar of the practice of ‘conjunctural analysis’ for how it began with an 
event (a robbery and injury in Birmingham) before spiralling out to diagnose the 
multiple forces that came together in a period of crisis. Beginning with this example, 
but drawing conjunctural analysis into relation with recent affect related work, we 
can identify four features which make conjunctural analysis distinctive.   
First, conjunctural analysis offers propositions by orientating to and articulating 
what is specific or particular to a present (with terms like ‘situation’, ‘age’, 
‘contemporary’ used interchangeably). Those propositions are contestable - 
hypotheses about what might be happening in a situation of intensifying change and 
unrest (a ‘conjuncture’) that goes beyond the now standard deconstructionist or 
Foucaultian injunction to problematize a phenomena to reveal its contingency. 
Propositions are based on a practice of attention to ‘conjunctures’ as occasions of 
limited but open-ended duration when antagonisms and contradictions “fuse” to 
form a “ruptural unity”, lived in and through crisis before some kind of resolution. 
As such, Hall ([1979]), after Gramsci, describes conjunctures in terms of unities-in-
difference composed of “related but distinct contradictions, moving according to 
very different tempos, whose condensation, in any particular historical moment, is 
what defines a conjuncture” (173).  
Second, conjunctural analysis is transversal in that description works between 
levels of abstraction and across different kinds of entities. In his analysis of 
Thatcherism, Hall (1988) emphasises the role of ideology to understand the 
remaking of common sense, in particular the new articulations between the ‘free 
market’ as a site of freedom and reworking of ‘Englishness’ that produces a form of 
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‘regressive modernization’, but he develops these propositions by moving between 
different kinds of things. Take his list of the precipitating conditions for Thatcherism: 
the break with the post-war consensus, the recomposition and fragmentation of 
relations of representation between classes and parties, the emergence of new social 
movements, the end of empire, amongst many others (ibid. 2). Propositions are 
offered through a practice of description that expands and contracts as it focuses on 
the practices of ‘articulation’ which allow differences to temporarily ‘merge’.   
 Third, and unlike certain forms of description associated with affect related 
work (e.g. Stewart 2007) conjunctural analysis is explanatory in the sense that it 
makes claims about causation. For example, in relation to “authoritarian populism” 
the images and representations that compose a “virulent, emergent, ‘petty 
bourgeois’ ideology” are described by Hall (1988: 41) as “factors” which “have 
effects on and for the social formation as a whole – including effects on the economic 
crisis itself and how it is likely to be politically resolved”. Rejecting an expressionist 
model of the relations between the economic and other spheres, Hall is at pains to 
stress, after Althusser, that conjunctures are always made through multiple 
determinations. This is not, though, the ‘billiard ball’ model of cause and effect 
(‘efficient causality’) which underpins some explanatory modes of analysis. What the 
vocabulary of (over)determination offers is a multiplication of causality in ways that 
echoes recent discussions of causality (see, for example, Bennett (2011) on 
“operators” or “convertors”). So, a structure of feeling might shape, an event 
interrupt, an affect imbued ideology initiate, an atmosphere catalyse, and so on.  
Finally, conjunctural analysis is speculative. As provisional unities in motion, 
conjunctures are riven by residual, pre-emergent, emergent, and dominant forces, 
apparatuses and events, to adapt Williams (1977) vocabulary of change. This means 
that the ‘present’ is never fully present, it is not a punctual, separate ‘now’. It is full 
of tendencies and latencies; traces of past and present futures which exert some kind 
of presence as they are felt through hope and other anticipatory affects, emergent 
social formations which coexist with dominant formations, residual events that live 
on and return in other forms with different affects. By speculation, I mean a practice 
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that produces (in the sense that description produces a ‘thick description’) 
possibilities and a different relation to those possibilities i.e. a named possibility and 
a relation of interest, engagement, horror, excitement etc. As such, speculation 
creates conditional claims - that this could have happened, or perhaps this might be 
happening.  
Conjunctural analysis is, then, always specific and subject to revision –
diagnosing the affective character of conjunctures which are and will become 
different. In its modes of relation and argumentation – propositional, transversal, 
explanatory and speculative – it differs from practices and forms of critique based 
primarily on a hermeneutics of suspicion and from affirmative or reparative modes 
of inquiry which disclose possibility. It offers for discussion and revision plausible, 
contestable propositions about the specificity of geo-historical conjunctures. What, then, are 
the politics of boredom in this conjuncture - in the midst of claims about the end of 
neoliberalism and the emergence of various populisms of the left and right – and 
how might they relate to the critique of the ‘ordinary ordinariness’ of fordism?  
 




During a debate between democratic presidential candidates, on the 26th June 
2019, Donald Trump sent out a single word tweet – BORING!. It was retweeted over 
79, 000 times and liked over 325, 000 as of 7th August 2019. The tweet – and reactions 
to it and interactions with it - became another quasi or pseudo event in the 
discontinuous flow of other almost but not quite mediated events which make up 
digital worlds (on which see Kember & Zylinska 2012). There was nothing unusual 
about the tweet. The judgment of politicians or parts of the state or media as boring 
is something Trump often does.  On the 7th August 2019, for example, he tweeted: 
“Watching Sleepy Joe Biden making a speech. Sooo Boring! The LameStream 
Media will die in the ratings and clicks with this guy. It will be over for them, not 
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to mention the fact that our Country will do poorly with him. It will be one big 
crash, but at least China will be happy!”. On March 15th 2020: “I must say, that 
was a VERY boring debate. Biden lied when he said I want to cut Social Security and 
Medicare. That’s what they ALL said 4 years ago, and nothing happened, in fact, I 
saved Social Security and Medicare. I will not be cutting, but they will. Be careful!”.  
Trump as a political-cultural figure and Trumpism as bellicose right-wing 
affective style will soon morph to live on as a more or less intense memory of a 
betrayed promise of future American ‘greatness’, or past warning of the intimacy 
between democracy and fascism, depending on political position. However, Trump 
is far from alone amongst populist politicians or supportive media in judging non-
populist political forms and practices as boring. As with Trump’s emphasis on the 
‘lamestream’ media, institutions or processes that have been central to liberalism are 
frequently labelled as boring. In the UK, for example, ‘Brexit boredom’, a 
detachment from the event, was regularly claimed by right-wing commentators and 
conservative politicians in relation to processes of parliamentary scrutiny and 
disagreement in the impasse post the 2016 referendum, and advocated as a reason 
for speeding up exiting the EU and enacting the ‘will of the people’. Specific 
politicians are labelled as boring in comparison to populists. The current leader of 
the UK labour party, Keir Starmer, for example, has been repeatedly labelled as 
‘dull’ and ‘boring’ by conservative commentators during his first 100 days in the role 
(e.g. The Spectator 13th July 2020, 17th July 2020). The accusation that politicians, 
institutions or processes are boring is not new. As well as the boringness of the social 
democratic ‘Big State’ and competition stifling bureaucracy, as discussed above, 
judgments of boredom have been key to the atmospheres that envelope formal 
politics in the wake of neoliberalism. They resonate with forms of “disaffected 
consent” (Gilbert 2015) through which neoliberalising policies and programmes are 
often encountered with an uneasy mix of discontent and acquiescence, rather than 
enthusiastic endorsement. At the same time, judgments of boredom can fuse with 
anger and ressentiment. Reactivating the new right’s backlash against ‘political 
correctness’ (see Ahmed 2011), the charge that liberal or left politics bores and 
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reduces or ends people’s feeling of autonomy and agency is violently expressed in 
critiques of the ‘woke’ gendered and racialised figure who is too earnest.  
How to understand this return of a critique of boredom in right-wing 
populism and its connection with the ‘promise of intensity’ which I argued was 
central to the critique of ‘ordinary ordinariness’ and the 1970s neoliberal 
counterrevolution? How, in short, to understand it conjuncturally? ‘Boring’ is a 
common aesthetic judgment. It implies that something – a scene, object, person – has 
not touched and moved the one uttering the judgment. As with all judgments of 
taste, the judgment performs connection and disconnection. It creates intimacy 
between those who share the judgment but who may otherwise have little in 
common other than their boredom on listening to ‘Sleepy Joe’, watching the 
‘lamestream media’, or, in the UK, reading about Brexit. When issued as a judgment, 
boredom is always a matter of division – between that which bores and that which is 
interesting. In judging something or someone as boring, dismissing it or them and 
separating oneself, the speaker also proclaims a right to be affected, to be moved – 
often signalled by the terms ‘interesting’ or ‘interested’ (Ngai 2005). For Trump and 
as we will see other populists, not being boring became another mark of distinction 
from a liberal elite, whilst also introducing spontaneity and unpredictability into the 
digitally mediated present. With grim predictability, the BORING! statement 
generated circuits of self-reinforcing, amplifying, outrage mixed with mockery in the 
replies and retweets by opponents who remained affected by Trump. 
Trump’s creation of scenes of intensity fuelled by mediated quasi-events 
enacted and exemplified the complex affective politics of right wing populism in 
North America and Western Europe where racialized resentments coexist with other 
collective affects, including charisma attached to the typically male figure of the 
authoritarian leader, and bellicose national optimism5. As I have argued elsewhere 
(Anderson 2017), right wing populism also regularly involves a kind of violent fun, 
                                                          
5 There are important connections beyond the scope of this paper between the return of the 
contemporary promise of intensity and the role of the experience of felt intensity in 1920s proto-
fascism and fascism (see, of many examples, Theweleit’s (1987) powerful and essential analysis of 
how the German Freikorpsmen, emerging from the first world war, made war, made death, into a 
way of life, inseparable from a hatred and dread of women and the feelings of violence).  
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linked to the promise of action without impediment or constraint. Whether it was 
excessive hand gestures as he mocked opponents, call and response chants at rallies 
where supporters laughed as they joined in, Trump embodied and offered his 
mostly white supporters an affective promise in the wake of neoliberalism – of a 
world in which action is no longer impeded by something external, and in which 
freedom is felt in and as intensity (his occasional performances of solemnity, whilst 
different in tone, shared this emphasis on intensity). We might note the resonances 
between the critique of the ‘ordinary ordinariness’ of fordism and the creation of 
scenes of intensity that shock, enrage or entertain by populist leaders (and the links 
to trolling, sinister mockery, anti-PC sensibilities and other practices of the online 
far-right). In more or less violent ways, fun is a key register in which this sense of 
excess is expressed and returns us to the relation with the open future and the 
embracing of uncertainty that was central to the promissory legitimacy of 
neoliberalism. Tellingly, Trump’s (1987) self-help book, The Art of the Deal, gives fun 
a pivotal role linking it to a heroic, masculine, entrepreneurial subject whose art is 
the ‘deal’. He stresses the value of fun in ways that resonate with the punks: “I try to 
learn from the past, but I plan for the future by focusing exclusively on the present. 
That’s where the fun is. And if it can’t be fun, what’s the point?” (ibid. 2). One of his 
core pieces of advice to his readership of would be entrepreneurial subjects is: ‘Have 
fun’ (ibid. 63). ‘Fun’ is here elevated to status of the value of a life worth living. Just 
as Trump is not alone in issuing judgments of boredom, he is not an exception in 
invoking fun and re-enacting the neoliberal promise of intensity by routing it 
through a sense of what individual sovereignty should feel like. Other populists also 
create scenes of intensity, in part by mobilising cultivated disorder and practiced 
spontaneity. In the UK, for example, Boris Johnson’s affective style also involves an 
image of action without restraint, a form of practical sovereignty or independence, 
and a sense of joy in living without embarrassment or shame (where fun is refracted 
through the aesthetics of the British upper classes (O’Toole 2018)). One campaign 
event during the 2019 UK general election exemplifies this affective style. Johnson 
drove a Forklift truck through a polystyrene wall in a otherwise empty warehouse. 
On the front of the Forklift truck was the promise of resolution which served as the 
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general election slogan of the conservative party: Get Brexit Done. As well as 
symbolising breaking an impasse, with the wall standing in for a blocked and stalled 
present, the scene was one of fun, the act being obviously outrageous and ridiculous. 
Johnson emerged smiling. The message being that it is the elite who are boring, who 
judge, and in doing so take life too seriously and steal enjoyment.  
The return of the promise of intensity in the form of populist events and 
slogans does not quite fit with the dominant claim about boredom today - where 
boredom is presumed to be absent as “crisis ordinariness” (Berlant 2011) is lived 
through burnout, stress, anxiety and other affects of frenzy (Chabot 2019). Against 
the background of ‘non-stop inertia’ (Southwood 2011), spreading and intensifying 
precarity, and fragmented and mobile attention engendered by digital worlds, a 
form of restorative boredom is advocated in an emerging self-help and management 
literature as one route to enhanced creativity (e.g. Time Out 2019; Zomorodi 2017). 
The fantasy and promise is not simply of empty time – time outside of the frenzy of 
life today – but an empty time that can be made productive (in ways that resonate 
with other practices of the present such as mindfulness and yoga, even if those 
practices should not be reduced to a neoliberal will to productivity (Coleman 2020)). 
This repeats a longstanding counter discourse about boredom that valorises 
boredom for the freedom that detachment inaugurates, but articulates it with the 
demand that all of life should be made productive as lines between work and life 
blur in the emphasis on the constant acquisition and maintenance of human capital 
(Feher 2009). The presumption being that unwanted, overwhelming, intensity has 
become a threat to constant ‘productivity’. In other words, the neoliberal promise of 
intensity has been realised but rather than positively coded as ‘fun’ as it is by Trump 
in The Art of the Deal it finds expression in harmful affects. Hence why the activist 
and artistic collective Plan C (2014, np) argue that anxiety has replaced boredom as 
the dominant ‘reactive affect’ of contemporary capitalism. Offering a strong, 
hyperbolic claim they argue that in the midst of the extension of relations of 
competition that is neoliberalism, anxiety has spread to the “whole social field. All 
forms of intensity, self-expression, emotional connection, immediacy, and enjoyment 
are now laced with anxiety. It has become the lynchpin of subordination”.     
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In comparison to critiques of fordism, the problem is that boredom is too 
absent and what is lost is an empty time that can be made productive (rather than 
empty time being a threat to productivity as in the figure of the bored assembly line 
worker). This diagnosis is absolutely critical for understanding the relations between 
affective life and neoliberalising practices and apparatuses, and opens up research 
on the forms of boredom that follow the demand to make all of life productive and 
the blurring of lines between work and other aspects of life. Nevertheless, it is 
partial. The promise of intensity in right-wing populism conjures a very different 
sense of the present, where felt control is missing as action is impeded, and crisis is 
lived as the flatness of muted frustration and tedium and disaffection. On this point 
there are connections back to the artistic critique of capitalism as enacted in relation 
to fordism by the UK punks, as well as surprising resonances between left and right 
populisms, usually around images of deindustrialised urban landscapes full of 
empty factories, broken infrastructures, and weary people. Perhaps it indicates that 
something of the character of the present has endured across fordism and 
neoliberalism, and that the promise of intensity remains to come for many in ‘stalled’ 
or ‘stuck’ time (Berlant 2011)? As well as the continuation of forms of fordist 
boredom in relation to factory work, perhaps these images of disaffection resonate 
with the new forms of boredom that accompany the intensification and extension of 
service and logistical work post the 2008 financial crisis. Unsurprisingly, then, it is 
not only right-wing populists who mobilise scenes of intensity. Politicians and 
activists on the left and centre are trying to reclaim intensity as a response to the 
crisis of liberalism. For example, the liberal democrats’ slogan in the 2019 UK general 
election - Bollocks to Brexit – and associated visual imagery recalled the Sex Pistols. 
As with the Sex Pistols practice, but arguably with far less success, the statement 
attempted to shock the public out of their brexit boredom, as well as establish an 
unambivalent position. Likewise, experiments with ‘pleasure activism’ (Brown 2019) 
or ‘acid communism/acid corbynism’ (e.g. Gilbert 2017; Fisher 2018) on the left aims 
to loosen the hold of forms of ‘left melancholia’, and explore other, democratic and 
egalitarian sensibilities. Left-wing populist campaigns also try and create and 
circulate scenes of intensity. Central to the Labour 2019 UK general election 
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campaign and Bernie Sanders’ (2016 – 2019) campaign for democratic presidential 
nominee were scenes of collective enthusiasm in which people are depicted as 
affected by politics. Echoing Winters (2016) comment on post-racial optimisms, 
Sanders’ 2016 campaign video ‘America’6 begins by depicting everyday scenes from 
multi-racial ‘America’. People are presented as immersed, involved, in their ordinary 
actions, whether working on a laptop in a coffee shop or feeding animals on a farm, 
before the advertisement shifts to people becoming increasingly animated as part of 
a crowd waiting for and then cheering and clapping for Sanders. What is offered is a 
promise of life of collective belonging without disaffection or division.   
That right-wing populism promises intensity does not imply that every 
supporter of populist parties or politicians attaches intensely or without 
ambivalence. It might, however, cause us to wonder about why, how and for whom 
boredom remains a problem and, more precisely, whether the promise of a life lived 
intensely still resonates with people’s ordinary life. However, a second public mood 
that surrounds boredom today suggests that disaffection does not endure as a 
problem in quite the same way that it did during fordism. Rather than being too 
present as we saw in relation to fordism or too absent in accounts of a precarious 
neoliberal present, another claim is that boredom is at once too absent and too 
present. Reprising fears of overstimulation and that have regularly played out 
throughout modernity, for example in relation to television and the classed figure of 
the ‘couch potato’ who ‘channel hops’, critics claim that digital capitalism is 
accompanied by a particular affective malaise characterised by perpetual, non-stop, 
restlessness and unease (e.g. Kingwell 2019). Boredom is simultaneously too present 
as a necessary affective condition for an attention economy that requires attention to 
be mobile and absent – in the sense that what exists is an anticipation of boredom 
and various pre-emptive escape attempts to avoid boredom (e.g. ‘the scroll’). The 
subject of digital capitalism is an almost-bored subject suspended between attention 
and inattention, attachment and detachment, captivation and escape, as they are 
perpetually connected to multiple informational and affective digital worlds. 
Perhaps, as Fisher (2018) speculated, contemporary capitalism has extirpated 
                                                          
6 Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2nwRiuh1Cug  
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boredom, replacing it with a mix of boredom and compulsion which we do not quite 
have a name for.   
Perhaps today’s right-wing populism requires this kind of ‘pre-boredom’ and 
subjects who regularly anticipate and pre-empt the possibility of boredom? The 
scenes of intensity associated with populism generate a sense of eventfulness. But 
they also promise strong, unambiguous, feeling as a counter to forms of experience 
mediated through the digital which increasingly make distinctions between flatness 
and intensity redundant. They also interrupt and provide an alternative to the sense 
of disaffection – the absence of affection – that Gilbert (2015) convincingly argues is a 
key affective correlate of neoliberalising apparatuses. In doing so, right-wing 
populism re-articulates through enmity orientated to racialised others one of the 
promises of neoliberalism in the wake of the much heralded ‘end’ of neoliberalism. 
As I argued above, central to the ‘promissory legitimacy’ (Beckert 2020) of 
neoliberalism in the context of the artistic critique of ‘ordinary ordinariness’ was the 
feeling of intensity as offered through the extension of relations of competition. This 
promise of the market as the means for a particular kind of experience coexisted and 
bolstered heteronormative ‘good life’ fantasies that had their origins in fordism, but 
were reactivated through neoliberalising apparatuses. These are now fraying 
(Berlant 2011). By comparison, the promise of intensity has been reactivated. It 
persists, with the market remaining one route for its realisation. From the premium 
placed on ‘liveness’ in the entertainment industries pre COVID-19 and the 
emergence of influencing as a type of affective labour based on the lure of 
authenticity, through to the growth of an ‘experience economy’ (Pine & Gilmore 
1999) and the role of immersive entertainment technologies in the home, consumer 
culture continues to offer a life lived intensely in which people will be affected (see 
also ‘user involvement/empowerment’ in the delivery of state functions (Newman 
2020)). However, the centrality of intensity to populist styles suggests that the hope 
invested in the market is being supplemented by the promise that politics can also be 
a scene of intensity, in ways that break with conditions of disaffection and apathy. 
Perhaps, to go further, the promise that the present can feel different not only 
remains but intensifies after the end of the future, in that populism happens in an 
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impasse characterised by a renewed orientation to the present after the double 
‘cancellation of the future’ – where both the futures of the Fordist settlement (Berlant 
2010) and the futures of a ‘viable’ non-capitalist horizon are lost (Fisher 2011). 
Discontent is channelled into a desire for the present to feel differently, as a response 
to the imaginative-affective foreclosure of “coherent” alternatives (Fisher 2011) and 
the fraying of belief in various heteronormative good life fantasies (Berlant 2011). 
What right-wing populism offers, then, as well as a return in the future to a stolen or 
lost heteronormative, white past (‘Make America Great Again’, ‘Take Back Control’), 
is a way of reactivating and expanding neoliberalism’s promise that life can be lived 
intensely. The always fragile conjoining of discontent and acquiescence is disrupted 
as fun mixes with the intensification of forms of anger and ressentiment. What 
mattered, then, in Trump’s mockery of opponents as BORING! was as much the 




What might staying with boredom allow us to notice about the affective 
presents which are entangled with fordist and neoliberal apparatuses? In this paper, 
I’ve speculated in response to a question that inaugurates a wider project by staying 
with a fraction of the ways in which boredom shows up, and experimenting with 
using it as a key diagnostic for an always multiple affective present. Whilst I have 
left it to the reader to make the connections, the strange relations to boredoms I have 
detailed here play out in relation to COVID-19, albeit in ways that are unclear, in 
part because they are still emergent as lines between emergency and normality blur. 
A matter of occasional public concern and yet secondary to other affects such as 
loneliness or anxiety in attempts to discern the feel of the pandemic and sometimes 
subject to jokey dismissal, boredom is at once affective correlate of a suspension of 
‘normality’ and index of both sacrifice (what is lost is enlivening sociality) and 
privilege (that boredom is felt, rather than or mixed with anxiety about risk, fear or 
job losses, or grief at loss). Perhaps the promise of intensity plays out in 
presumptions about what normality should feel like and what is lost, and which 
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experiences might return in a promised but deferred post-pandemic ‘normality’. As 
with all affects, boredom in relation to COVID-19 and my account of fordism and 
neoliberalism is already many different kinds of things in ways that complicate any 
simple story. As well as the experience of the suspension of anticipation and a 
relation of detachment, boredom is simultaneously: public problem, expression of a 
subject, genre of aesthetic judgment, cause, symptom, background that finds 
expression in something else, governance problem, and herald. Any account of the 
present that starts from boredom, which wonders about the curious intimacy 
between absence of affection and the movement of detachment, must track the 
relations between different kinds of things boredom might be. How has the use of 
‘boring’ as an ordinary aesthetic judgment changed? Who claims boredom as a cause 
of actions or makes it into a public problem?, whose boredom is governed and how 
and whose is forgotten?, and so on.   
 In order to understand the specificity of affective presents, I’ve contributed to 
affect related work by advocating and exemplifying a mode of diagnostic critique 
based on a practice of conjunctural analysis. Taking inspiration from the political 
writings of Stuart Hall and colleagues, at the heart of this practice is an orientation to 
the diverse forces that compose a conjuncture, rather than the detail of encounters or 
scenes which characterise attempts to “provoke attention to the forces that come into 
view” through evocative affect imbued description (Stewart, 2007: 1). To be clear, my 
aim is to supplement, rather than replace, these and the other modes of inquiry. As a 
propositional, transversal, explanatory, and anticipatory practice, conjunctural 
analysis steps outside of a relation of either condemnation or redemption with 
affective life (the critical or reparative moves). Instead, it understands how the 
present feels by staying with the question of (dis/re)articulation: how and with what 
consequences is boredom, if it is always many things, articulated with other forces?  
Through this practice, I have offered a proposition: contemporary right wing 
populism reactivates the promise of intensity at a time when the legitimacy of 
neoliberalism’s other promises are ending, fading, fraying and otherwise changing 
in a transitional present lived, felt and narrated in terms of crisis. The promise of 
intensity incorporated the artistic critique of ‘ordinary ordinariness’ which emerged 
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from the 1960s, and honed in on the impoverished life of fordism. Promising 
autonomy and agency through the market, the fantasy is of a world of intensity 
without the absence of engagement and attachment, the flatness, which came to 
haunt fordist work and leisure as patterns of expectation and aspiration changed. 
Although contradicted by actually existing neoliberalisms, the promise remains 
durable. It continues to be offered through consumer culture and in relation to work, 
but is also reactivated in the content, tone and style of right-wing populism, as it is 
articulated with a renewal of violent heteronormative, white fantasies. As with the 
neoliberal counter revolution, the critique of boredom attaches to liberal politicians 
and forms and institutions. Not only corrupt, not only separated from the interests 
of the people, liberal politicians are presented as boring. They are responsible for the 
persistence of a flat world.  
Propositions are offered to be disrupted. Conjunctural analysis is partial and 
contingent. Alongside my speculations about right-wing populism and boredom, 
I’ve offered the beginnings of other stories about boredom and the present, which 
gesture towards a wider research project. Alongside the return of the promise of 
intensity, for example, is a critique of the problem of intensity in crisis ordinariness, 
as articulated in concern about burnout, stress and anxiety. In response to the 
problem of too much intensity, of being overwhelmed, the empty time of boredom 
becomes a hoped for experience, once again valued both for its claimed links to 
productivity but also for its nostalgic connection to a simpler, easier life (a relation 
we again see playing out in relation to COVID-19 through calls to enjoy enforced 
boredom as respite from incessant demands and overwhelming busy-ness). The 
demand for intensity we see in populism coexists, then, with a demand for a kind of 
emptiness that promises to restore what is lost in a world without boredom. We see 
articulations of this kind of ‘comforting boredom’ recently in the realm of formal 
politics, where the boredom of liberalism becomes a virtue connected to the hope of 
a more habitable present. For example, it exists in the ‘no drama’ campaigns of 
liberal-centrist politicians such as Joe Biden or Keir Starmer and their promise to end 
the turbulence of contemporary formal politics and inaugurate a return to a pre-
populist political normal of non-eventfulness (where intensity, such as it continues 
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to exist, gets channelled into passionate calls for ‘unity’ and renewed liberal 
optimism). There are many other boredoms, entangled with the different forces 
re/unmaking this transitional moment of ‘crisis ordinariness’ and ‘crisis crisis’. 
Listing them here is a way to acknowledge that multiplicity and the partiality of the 
proposition I’ve offered, as well as anticipate future research: lingering boredoms of 
the margins linked to un or under employment, tolerated boredoms of the optimistic 
attachment, frustrated boredoms of non-realised or deferred promises, carceral 
boredoms of confinement, boredom of wasted in-between time, the anticipation of 





A version of this paper was delivered as the Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space Annual Lecture at the RGS-IBG, 2019. Thanks to the editors for the 
invitation, subsequent comments, and patience as strikes and covid-19 delayed me 
finishing this text. Versions were also presented as a public lecture at the 2019 
Transmediale conference and as the 2019 Alexander von Humboldt Lecture, University 
Wageningen. My thanks to audiences for their interest, questions and discussions. 
Returning to boredom was sparked by conversations with Jen Bagelman, Noam 
Leshem, and Helen Wilson. Huge thanks to them and other friends for comments on 
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